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About This Report 
 
     This report was produced at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for Eco-
nomic Development (UWMCED), a unit of the College of Letters and Science at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. The College established UWMCED in 1990, with 
the assistance of a grant from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Develop-
ment Administration’s “University Center” program, to provide university research and 
technical assistance to community organizations and units of government working to 
improve the Greater Milwaukee economy. In 2000, UWMCED also became part of 
UWM’s “Milwaukee Idea,” as one of the core units of the “Consortium for Economic 
Opportunity.” The analysis and conclusions presented in this report are solely those of 
UWMCED and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of UW-Milwaukee or 
the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
     The author of this report is Dr. Marc V. Levine, director of UWMCED. Lauren 
McHargue, Kathleen Schilling, and Lisa Heuler Williams, all policy analysts at the Cen-
ter, provided indispensable assistance. 
     UWMCED strongly believes that informed public debate is vital to the development 
of good public policy. The Center publishes briefing papers, detailed analyses of eco-
nomic trends and policies, and “technical assistance” reports on issues of applied eco-
nomic development. In these ways, as well as in conferences and public lectures spon-
sored by the Center, we hope to contribute to public discussion of economic develop-
ment policy in Southeastern Wisconsin. 
     Further information about the Center and its reports and activities is available at our 









Recently released employment data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics confirm that Milwaukee remains in the throes of a “stealth depression” of 
joblessness. In the aftermath of the 1990s economic boom, Milwaukee’s em-
ployment picture deteriorated faster and more extensively than in other cities 
between 2000-2002 –even as Milwaukee’s suburban labor markets remain 
solid. By 2002, 42.9 percent of working-age residents of the city of Milwaukee 
did not hold jobs. 
For black Milwaukeeans, the situation is even bleaker. In 2002, an astound-
ing 58.8 percent of working-age African American males in the city of Mil-
waukee were jobless, by far the highest rate of joblessness found in any of the 
cities surveyed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Racial disparities in employment in both metro Milwaukee and the city of 
Milwaukee are the highest in the country. In 2002, black male joblessness in 
metropolitan Milwaukee was 29.2 percentage points higher than white jobless-
ness; only one other metro area (Kansas City) had a racial gap higher than 20 
points. The black jobless rate was 25.7 percentage points higher than the white 
rate in the city of Milwaukee.  
By any reckoning, the city of Milwaukee faces nothing short of an employ-







Last year, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for Economic Develop-
ment released a report documenting how, despite the national economic boom, job-
lessness had grown during the 1990s in the city of Milwaukee. In many neighbor-
hoods, we reported that over half of the working age population was either unem-
ployed or not actively looking for work, and that Milwaukee’s racial disparities in em-
ployment were higher than any city and metropolitan area in the country. We called 
this labor market situation a “stealth depression:” a crisis of joblessness, particularly in 
the black community, which seemed to have escaped the attention of the city’s politi-
cal and business leadership. 1 
This follow-up report, using recently released data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), confirms that Milwaukee remains in the throes of a “stealth depres-
sion.” Although the labor market remains relatively robust in the Milwaukee suburbs, 
joblessness has climbed steadily in the city of Milwaukee since the economic boom 
ended in 2000 –and at a much higher rate than in other cities surveyed by BLS. More-
over, for Milwaukee’s African-American community, joblessness has increased sub-
stantially since the end of the boom, even since the technical end of the recession in 
2001.  For black Milwaukee, this has truly been a jobless recovery so far. Racial dis-
parities in joblessness in Milwaukee remain higher than in any city and any metropoli-
tan area in the country surveyed by the BLS.  
 
 
1See UW-Milwaukee Center for Economic Development, Stealth Depression: Joblessness in the 
City of Milwaukee Since 1990 (Milwaukee: UWMCED, 2003). Neighborhood-level labor market 
data is contained in the Center’s report, The Economic State of Milwaukee’s Inner City, 1970-





Public interest in labor market conditions usually focuses on one key number: the 
unemployment rate. As we reported in Stealth Depression, the official unemployment 
rate began rising dramatically in Milwaukee in the late 1990s, at a much faster rate 
than almost any of the nation’s largest cities. Consequently, by 2003, Milwaukee had 
the 44th highest unemployment rate among the nation’s 50 largest cities (up from 16th 
highest in 1992).  
However, as we have become painfully aware during the national post-2001 job-
less recovery, the unemployment rate can be a misleading statistic. The unemploy-
ment rate measures the percentage of people over the age of 16 in the civilian labor 
force, actively looking for work, who do not have a job. It does not include working-
age people who are jobless but, for various reasons, are not in the labor force.  
Some, such as most students and homemakers, as well as the voluntarily self-
employed or voluntarily retired, choose not to be in the labor force. However, many 
other potential workers are not included in the unemployment statistics even though 
they are jobless.  Some are “discouraged” workers, who have given up looking for 
elusive employment. Others may simply not enter the labor market, convinced that 
jobs are simply not available. The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not classify these 
people as unemployed. 
Consequently, because it does not measure the unemployed who are not in the ci-
vilian labor force, the official unemployment rate understates the extent of jobless-
ness. Paradoxically, the official unemployment rate can stay stable or even decline, 
even as the number of jobless increases among the working-age population, if those 
without jobs have dropped out of the civilian labor force (and thus are no longer 
counted as unemployed). This is precisely what has happened nationally since 2000, 
as approximately five million working age adults have dropped out of the civilian la-
bor force – yet, the unemployment rate has remained generally steady since Novem-
ber, 2001. Clearly, then, the unemployment rate does not give us a full picture of the 




A different way, therefore, to gauge joblessness is to look at the percentage of the 
total working-age population not employed: everyone over the age of 16, not just 
those in the civilian labor force.  Obviously, this rate will never be zero: as noted 
above, there will always be working-age students, homemakers, retirees, or the self-
employed who are voluntarily not in the labor force. Typically, in extremely tight, es-
sentially “full employment” labor markets such as metropolitan Seattle and San Fran-
cisco at the end of the 1990s boom, about 25-30 percent of the total working-age 
population is not employed (although, as we shall see, this figure varies by race, eth-
nicity, and gender). 2 
However, by looking at employment among the entire working-age population in-
stead of simply unemployment among the civilian labor force, what might be called a 
“jobless rate” takes into account the problem of discouraged workers and thus gives us 





2The BLS data, drawn from the Current Population Survey, provide for 50 large metropolitan areas 
and 17 large cities, “employment-population” ratios: the number of employed divided by the 
“civilian noninstitutional population,” defined by BLS as persons over the age of 16 not in the 
armed forces, prisons, or other institutions (essentially, the working-age population). Joblessness is 
calculated by subtracting the employment-population ratio from 100%. Thus, if the employment-




Growing Joblessness Since 2000 
 
Using the most recent BLS subnational data3 covering the entire working-age 
population (which run through 2002), Tables 1 and 2 show that joblessness has grown 
across the country and in Milwaukee since the economic boom ended in 2000. More-
over, even though the recession officially ended in 2001, joblessness continued to rise 
in 2002. 
As Table 1 shows, joblessness among the working-age population grew by three 
percentage points in metro Milwaukee between 2000-2002, slightly faster than for the 
average for the fifty large metropolitan areas surveyed by the BLS. Nevertheless, the 
jobless rate here remained below the national metro average through 2002. 
On the other hand, as Table 2 shows, joblessness rose steeply in the city of Mil-
waukee after the boom ended, by over seven percentage points between 2000-2002. 
Nationally, in the cities surveyed by BLS, the jobless rate rose by a little less than 
three percentage points during this period. Consequently, although the jobless rate in 
Milwaukee was lower than the national big city average in 2000, by 2002 Milwau-
kee’s jobless rate was two percentage points higher than the national urban rate. 
Three important trends are immediately apparent in these tables. First, although 
joblessness has increased in metropolitan Milwaukee since 2000, it still remains lower 
here than the average of large metropolitan areas. Indeed, when we rank the metro-
politan areas surveyed by BLS in 2002 from the lowest to the highest jobless rate, 
metro Milwaukee placed 9th   out of 50. On the whole, despite erosion since 2000, the 
labor market situation in metro Milwaukee remains solid, although, as we shall see, 
this has been due chiefly to the excellent labor market conditions in suburban  
Milwaukee. 
3An important note of caution: the BLS rates are based on the monthly CPS survey of 60,000 
households nationally. Consequently, for any one city or metro area, the smaller sample size means 
that the rates are estimates within a range of sampling error. In fact, for certain cities with relatively 
small samples of certain demographic groups – blacks in Salt Lake City or Hispanics in Buffalo, for 
example—BLS does not report employment estimates because they do not meet the minimum base 
for reliability. For more on the BLS sampling, see Geographic Profile of Employment and 





Joblessness Among the Working-Age Population 
in Metropolitan Areas, 2000-2002 
 
(jobless percentage of entire population over age of 16) 




2000 34.0 30.2 
2001 34.8 31.3 
2002 36.1 33.2 
*Average jobless rate nation’s fifty largest metropolitan areas,  
surveyed by the BLS 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, 2000, 





Joblessness Among the Working-Age Population 
in Cities, 2000-2002 
 
(jobless percentage of entire population over age of 16) 
Year National City  
Average* 
City of  
Milwaukee 
2000 38.1 35.5 
2001 39.4 38.3 
2002 40.9 42.9 
*Average jobless rate in 17 large cities, surveyed by the BLS 




Second, the employment decline in the city of Milwaukee has been precipitous since 
2000, with joblessness here increasing much faster than in other cities. In 2000, Milwau-
kee’s jobless rate ranked 7th of the 17 large cities surveyed by BLS (ranked from lowest 
to highest); by 2002, we had fallen to 13th. Our earlier research in Stealth Depression re-
vealed that compared to other big cities, even during the economic boom, the city of Mil-
waukee’s labor market underperformed. Clearly, however, Milwaukee’s decline has been 
much more rapid than other cities since the 2001 recession and during the post-2001 
“jobless recovery.” 
Finally, the tables reveal a widening gap since 2000 in the performance of the city and 
suburban labor markets in metropolitan Milwaukee. In 2000, joblessness in the city of 
Milwaukee ran 5.3 percentage points higher than for metro Milwaukee as a whole; in 
2002, the city’s jobless rate was 9.7 points higher. Since the metro rate includes the city, 
the best estimate is that joblessness in the city of Milwaukee in 2002 was about 16 per-
centage points higher than the suburban rate (up from a 9 percentage point gap in 2000). 4 
In short, since 2000 the metro Milwaukee has become increasingly polarized into two 
distinct labor markets: one, a robust, suburban job market where joblessness has barely 
increased since the end of the 1990s boom; the other, a city labor market where jobless-
ness has surged and where, by 2002, over 42 percent of the working-age population was 
not employed. 
 
4 Although the BLS does not provide employment-population ratios separately for the suburbs, 
we can disaggregate the metro area rate by taking the city’s proportion of the metro area’s work-
ing-age population (40%), and then, since we know the city’s jobless rate, making the necessary 
calculations to estimate the suburban rate. 
UWMCED  
11 
Widening Racial Disparities Since 2000 
 
This labor market polarization is especially striking when we break down jobless rates 
by race and ethnicity since 2000 in the cities and metropolitan areas surveyed by the BLS. 
These data are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Once again, although there was a rise in jobless-
ness across the board since 2000 –including increases after the recession ended in 2001—
the variations by race and ethnicity are stark. 
In 2000, at the end of the economic boom, joblessness among whites and Hispanics in 
both metro Milwaukee and the city of Milwaukee was significantly lower than the average 
rate for these groups in the nation’s large metropolitan areas and cities. Moreover, although 
the black jobless rate remained slightly higher here than the national metropolitan average, 
the gains of the 1990s had brought black joblessness in Milwaukee closer to the national av-
erage than ever before.  
Table 3: 
 
Jobless Rates for the Working-Age Population 
By Race and Ethnicity in 
U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 2000-2002 
 

















2000 33.3 29.1 37.8 38.4 31.5 25.1 
2001 34.1 29.6 38.8 44.9 33.3 28.1 
2002 35.3 30.9 41.2 52.0 33.9 33.7 
Source: BLS, Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment 





Jobless Rates for the Working-Age Population 
By Race and Ethnicity in 
Selected U.S. Cities, 2000-2002 
 











2000 35.7 34.8 43.7 35.9 34.6 29.5 
2001 36.5 34.3 45.1 46.3 35.6 34.5 
2002 37.8 38.4 46.6 53.3 37.6 40.7 
                            White                              Black                                Hispanic 
Source: BLS, Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment 
Between 2000-2002, however, the bottom fell out of the labor market for blacks 
in Milwaukee. By 2002, 52 percent of metro Milwaukee’s black working-age popula-
tion was either unemployed or not in the labor force (up from 38.4 percent in 2000). 
This rate of joblessness was almost 11 percentage points higher than the average job-
less rate in the large metropolitan areas surveyed by the BLS. (The same pattern is 
observable in the smaller sample of cities –14—for which the BLS could obtain reli-




The collapse of the job market for blacks in Milwaukee after 2000 has been dramatic. In 
2000, among the largest metropolitan areas for which the BLS had data on black jobless-
ness, Milwaukee ranked 22nd of 37 metro areas (arrayed from lowest to highest rates). By 
2002, among all of the nation’s large metropolitan areas, only Rochester, N.Y. had a higher 
rate of black joblessness than did Milwaukee. The 21 percentage point gap separating black 
and white joblessness in metropolitan Milwaukee in 2002 was, by far, the largest in country. 
By contrast, the next highest gap in black-white jobless rates was in metropolitan Rochester, 
at 14.7 percent.  
Since the end of the economic boom, joblessness in Milwaukee (and nationally) has in-
creased much more rapidly for blacks than for whites (and much more rapidly for blacks 
here than for blacks across the country). Between 2000-2002, the black jobless rate in metro 
Milwaukee surged by 13.6 percentage points (compared to a 3.4 percentage point rise na-
tionally); by contrast, the white jobless rate increased modestly, by 1.8 points (less than the 
national white metro area increase of 2.1 percentage points), while the Hispanic rate in-
creased in Milwaukee by 8.6 percentage points (compared to a 2.4 percentage point increase 
nationally). Clearly, minority workers have absorbed the heaviest job losses in Milwaukee 
during the recession and the post-2001 jobless recovery.  
 
 
The Continuing Employment Crisis of Black Males  
In Milwaukee 
 
The deepening racial and ethnic polarization of Milwaukee’s labor market since the eco-
nomic boom ended can be seen even more clearly if we control for the analytic ambiguities 
involving gender and workforce participation and look solely at employment among the 





Jobless Rates for Working-Age Males, 
By Race and Ethnicity in 
U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 2001-2002 
 

















2001 26.6 25.2 37.2 49.2 21.5 20.8 
2002 27.9 24.8 37.7   54.0* 23.5 25.4 
                                         White                                Black                                Hispanic 
Table 6: 
Jobless Rates for Working-Age Males, 
By Race and Ethnicity in Selected 
U.S. Cities, 2001-2002 
 
(jobless percentage of male population over age of 16) 
 
Source: BLS, Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment 
*This is an estimate: in 2002, the BLS only provides employment-population  
ratios in metro Milwaukee for the entire black population and for women 
Year National  
Average 
 









2001 29.2 30.7 43.8 51.8 23.5 25.1 
2002 30.8 33.1 43.9 58.8 26.5 26.9 
                                          White                             Black                                Hispanic 




and ethnicity is only available since 2001.5 Nevertheless, these data give us a clear indication of 
how working-age minority males have fared in the Milwaukee job market since the 2001 reces-
sion: a) in comparison to whites; and b) in comparison to minorities in other large metropolitan 
areas and cities surveyed by the BLS.  
As Tables 5 and 6 clearly show, the post-boom years have deepened the employment crisis 
facing Milwaukee’s African American males. By 2002, the black male jobless rate in metro Mil-
waukee ran 16.3 percentage points higher than the national metro area average for black males, 
and almost thirty percentage points higher than the white and Hispanic jobless rates in metro-
politan Milwaukee (see Table 5). Similarly wide racial and ethnic disparities exist when the city 
of Milwaukee is compared to other big cities surveyed by the BLS. Most distressingly, these gaps 
all widened after the recession ended in 2001, a sign that the black male employment crisis in 
Milwaukee, at least through 2002, had not been alleviated by the post-2001 resumption of eco-
nomic growth. At the metro area level, the gap between black male joblessness in Milwaukee and 
the national MSA average for black males grew by 4.3 percentage points between 2001 and 2002, 
and the gap between black and white male joblessness in metro Milwaukee grew by 5.2 percent-
age points during that same year. 
By 2002, an astounding 58.8 percent of working-age African American males in the city of 
Milwaukee were jobless, by far the highest rate of joblessness found in any of the cities surveyed 
by the BLS (Chicago and Detroit were the other cities in which more than half the working-age 
black males were out of work in 2002). 54 percent of working-age black males in metro Milwau-
kee were without work in 2002; only two other metropolitan areas  --Rochester, N.Y. (51.0 per-
cent) and Buffalo (51.5 percent) – reported that a majority of African American males were not 
working. As Table 7 shows, metro Milwaukee had the highest racial disparity in male joblessness 
of any metropolitan area surveyed by BLS. Similarly, as Table 8 reveals, the racial employment 
gap among males was wider in the city of Milwaukee than any other city.           
5 And even in these years, this data is not available for all of the cities and metro areas surveyed by BLS (it 
is available for around 80 percent of them). 
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Metropolitan Area White Jobless Rate Black Jobless Rate Disparity  
Atlanta 19.6 26.5 6.9 
Baltimore 26.0 36.9 10.9 
Boston 26.3 30.4 4.1 
Buffalo 33.7 51.5 17.8 
Charlotte 26.4 38.6 12.2 
Chicago 26.8 44.5 17.7 
Cincinnati 27.2 44.5 17.3 
Cleveland 27.6 33.9 6.3 
Columbus 24.8 35.3 10.5 
Dallas 21.7 25.4 3.7 
Dayton 38.7 47.0 8.3 
Denver 24.1 35.9 11.8 
Detroit 29.9 46.6 16.7 
Ft. Lauderdale 29.5 27.4 (2.1) 
Hartford 27.9 36.1 8.2 
Houston 22.2 35.6 13.4 
Kansas City 24.6 45.0 20.4 
Los Angeles 28.2 42.5 14.3 
Memphis 24.7 30.5 5.8 
Miami 37.2 31.4 (5.8) 
Milwaukee** 24.8 54.0 29.2 
Minneapolis 21.6 31.0 9.4 
Nassau-Suffolk 28.4 39.4 11.0 
New Orleans 32.7 41.6 8.9 
New York 35.8 44.0 8.2 
Newark 26.6 39.6 13.0 
Norfolk-Va. Beach 30.2 42.7 12.5 
Oakland 25.2 41.4 16.2 
Oklahoma City 28.7 32.4 3.7 
Philadelphia 29.2 41.8 12.6 
Phoenix-Mesa 27.3 25.3 (2.0) 
Providence 30.9 29.1 (1.8) 
Riverside 29.0 39.3 10.3 
Rochester, N.Y.** 33.1 51.0 17.9 
St. Louis 27.9 40.1 12.1 
Tampa 35.1 36.9 1.8 
Washington, D.C. 20.7 29.8 9.1 
Table 7: 
 
Racial Disparities in Employment for Males 
In Metropolitan Areas, 2002* 
 
(jobless rates, by race, for all working-age males) 
Source: BLS, Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment 
*Certain metro areas not included because BLS did not report employment by race and/or gender.  
**Black rate for males is estimated; BLS data provides total black rate and rate for black women.  
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City White Jobless Rate Black Jobless Rate Disparity 
Baltimore 33.7 46.6 12.9 
Chicago 27.6 50.6 23.0 
Cleveland 33.7 40.5 6.8 
Dallas 21.4 33.3 11.9 
Detroit 55.6 51.8 (3.8) 
District of Columbia 19.4 41.8 22.4 
Houston 21.4 40.9 19.5 
Los Angeles 27.4 41.8 14.4 
Milwaukee 33.1 58.8 25.7 
New York 37.4 44.3 6.6 
Philadelphia 40.2 49.7 9.5 
Phoenix 25.4 30.7 5.3 
St. Louis 26.5 39.9 13.4 
Table 8: 
 
Racial Disparities in Employment for Males 
In Cities, 2002* 
 
(jobless rates, by race, for all working-age males) 
Source: BLS, Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment 
* Certain cities not included because BLS did not report employment by race and/or gender. 
 
There is a final analytic point worth noting: the disparities in joblessness revealed in Tables 5 
and 6 between blacks and Hispanics in Milwaukee. Clearly, joblessness among working-age His-
panics –particularly among males—is substantially lower than black joblessness in Milwaukee. 
The black jobless rate is over twice the Hispanic rate in the city, and the gap widened in the year 
after the 2001 recession. Moreover, while black joblessness is much higher in Milwaukee than it 
is nationally, the Hispanic jobless rate in Milwaukee fairly closely tracks the national average.  
We do not yet have research to explain these rather substantial differences in minority community 
employment in Milwaukee. Some have speculated that the emergence of an entrepreneurial, 
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linguistic “enclave economy” has boosted economic development in Milwaukee’s Hispanic 
community, but we will need in-depth research to confirm that hypothesis. It will be research 
worth doing, with potentially important policy implications, as the data presented in this re-
port reveal a stark contrast in employment among the working-age males of Milwaukee’s 
two major minority communities. 
     
Conclusion 
 
By any reckoning, the “stealth depression” in Milwaukee’s job market not only contin-
ued in Milwaukee after the 1990s boom, but deepened in the first years of the 21st century. 
Overall, the city of Milwaukee’s employment picture deteriorated faster and more exten-
sively than in other cities between 2000-2002 – even as Milwaukee’s suburban labor markets 
remained solid.      
Consequently, in hypersegregated Milwaukee, with one of the lowest rates of black sub-
urbanization of any metropolitan area in the country, the post-2000 difficulties in the city of 
Milwaukee labor market have exacted a fearsome toll on the city’s black community, par-
ticularly for working-age males. Milwaukee remains the city and metropolitan area in the 
United States with the highest rates of black joblessness, and where the employment dispari-
ties between whites and blacks remain the widest. Despite the 1990s boom, the crisis of 
black joblessness has not abated here; indeed, by any measure, whatever gains blacks made 
in Milwaukee during the 1990s were wiped out by the recession and “jobless recovery” of 
the 2000-2002 period. 58.8 percent of working-age African American males in the city of 
Milwaukee were without work in 2002 – a shocking statistic that reveals all we need to know 
about the effectiveness of economic development and job growth strategies over the past 
decade in this city.  
In last year’s Stealth Depression report, we delineated a range of policy options that Mil-
waukee might consider to address the city’s employment crisis: public investment, reduced 
city-suburban segregation, regional cooperation, industrial policy, and community benefits 
agreements with developers. As we noted, these hardly exhaust the range of new policies 
that could combat joblessness in Milwaukee, and we also noted the need for state and federal 
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policies to address the employment crisis. But, before we can even begin the necessary   
public debate about policy options, we need recognition by political and corporate 
leaders here that there is indeed a crisis – a recognition and urgency that so far has 
been lacking. As we approach the election of a mayor in Milwaukee, as well as a 
county executive in Milwaukee county, the time is long overdue, as we noted last year, 
“to acknowledge the seriousness of Milwaukee’s ‘stealth depression’ and to recognize 
that ‘business as usual’ has failed to combat the city’s structural employment crisis.”     
